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NOTES
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL IN KENTUCKY
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty where the government's purposes are beneficient .....
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by
men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.1
Introduction
Involuntary commitment of the mentally ill presents special prob-
lems, unparalleled in any other area of the law. As in a criminal
proceeding, the state is seeking to confine, but unlike the criminal,
the mentally ill individual can be incarcerated without performing
any wrongful act. The mere possibility that a person "probably will"
cause harm to himself or others is sufficient to justify confinement,2
sometimes for an indeterminate period.3 If a sociologist predicts
that there is an eighty percent probability that a person will commit
a criminal act, he cannot be confined; however, if a psychiatrist
testifies that the same person is mentally ill and equally likely to
commit the same act,4 the person can be committed.
The proceeding for commitment is generally classified as civil,5
but since deprivation of liberty may result, aspects of a criminal
trial are present. The commitment hearing itself with the person
defending his liberty against the state acting through a prosecutor0
more closely resembles a criminal trial than a civil trial. However, the
proceeding cannot be classified as criminal, since there need be no
present violation of the law; but it cannot be correctly categorized
as civil because of the potential incarceration. In Kentucky the Court
of Appeals, recognizing this inconsistency, has classified the proceeding
as quasi-criminal,7 neither wholly civil nor wholly criminal.8
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
2 See Ky. 1_Ev. STAT. § 202.010 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 KRS § 202.135.
4 Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79
HAv. L. REv. 1288, 1290 (1966).
rCadden v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1951).6 The statute sometimes calls the proposed patient a defendant. See, e.g., KRS
§§ 202.010, 202.136-37.
7 Sabin v. Commonwealth, 26 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1930).8 Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
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The confinement in a mental hospital which may result from such
a proceeding can be a tragic experience. For example, a visitor to a
state mental hospital in Kentucky, although initially impressed by
the lack of bars and uniformed attendants, will later discover that
these precautions are no longer necessary because of the increased use
of tranquilizers. He will also note that, while a serious attempt has
been made to remove the sterile, institutional atmosphere, there are
still no walls between beds in the wards, and privacy is non-existent
In addition, the danger of attack by periodically violent patients is
a constant threat. The effect of these and other elements upon the
inhabitants of mental institutions is enormous, and horrifying. This
fact was documented in 1966 when it was discovered that while the
death rate per 1,000 persons in the United States for that year was
9.5, the rate among resident mental patients was 91.8.9 In Kentucky
the figures were even more alarming: the death rate per 1,000 people
in the general population was 10; the rate per 1,000 resident mental
patients was 125.8, a ratio of 12.6 to 1.0
Even after release from a mental institution, serious consequences
may follow, affecting the former patient's entire career. This was
amply demonstrated by Senator Thomas Eagleton's withdrawal as
Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1972 as a result of the
publicity of his having received mental treatment some years before.
Often, former mental patients do not get jobs, an unfortunate
reality which has prompted the observation that "in the job market
it is better to be an ex-felon than an ex-mental patient."1
These tragic results have made the law cautious not to commit,
as mentally ill, citizens who are only slightly odd or eccentric, and
as a result conflicts have arisen between legal and medical values.
The lawyer is concerned with an individual's liberty, his right to
remain free to do as he pleases; the doctor often is more concerned
with the patient's medical interest. Professor H. A. Ross offers the
hypothetical case of an old man who makes a comfortable living on
his farm but who is subject to periods of severe depression. According
to psychiatric testimony there is a two to one chance that during the
next few years he will commit suicide while in a depressed state.
9 Furman and Conners, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8 Du-
QuEsNE L. REv. 32, 65-66 (1970).
10 Id. The wide disparity may be explained in part by the different popula-
tions being measured. There are no babies and few children in mental hospitals,
and many aged patients are hospitalized only because they are suffering the effects
of senility.
11 Testimony of Bruce I. Ennis, Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), as cited in Lessard v. Schmidt,
849 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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The farmer recognizes the risk but would prefer to live on his farm
and take his chances. 12 The lawyer would probably seek to allow
the man to make his own decision; the doctor's training would prob-
ably convince him to seek commitment.
The purpose of this note is to examine how Kentucky case law
and statutes attempt to reach a compromise between the patient's
legal rights and his medical needs. The following is not a theoretical
discussion but rather is an attempt to provide the practicing attorney
with a working guide for use in commitment cases. Commitment of
the mentally ill is not a particularly well-known area of the law,
and the statutes are somewhat intricate. Moreover, although civil
commitment is a statutory proceeding, the relevant case law is very
important and must be understood before an attorney can knowl-
edgeably try a commitment case. The scope of this note is limited to
Kentucky law; there has been no attempt to delineate majority/
minority rules nor to examine the commitment laws of other states.
Foreign case law and United States Supreme Court decisions are
discussed only where relevant to an understanding of Kentucky law.
I. HISToicAL OvEawviw oF CnVL ComlnarwT
For centuries, governmental power has been used to confine
mentally ill persons.13 Under the English statute De Prarogative
Regis enacted between 1255 and 1290, the King became guardian of
the person and goods of a lunatic,14 and the lunatic was commited
to the custody of a friend who received an allowance for his care.'5
This practice was justified not only by the need to prevent the person
from injuring others'0 but also by the desire to protect those who
could not care for themselves. 17 In addition, it removed the burden
of responsibility from the lunatic's family.' During lucid moments
the incompetent was permitted to manage his own property and to
exercise his civil rights, and, on such occasions, was entitled to an
accounting from the king.19
In Colonial America, parents and family were expected to care for
12 Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
Mici. L. REv. 945, 957 (1959).
13 F. LumwMA & D. McLNT1'nY, THE MENTALLY DisABr AND nm LAw 10
(1961) [hereinafter cited as F. LimA & D. McINYREI.
14 1 W. HoLDswoTH, A Histony oF ENGLISH LAV 473-76 (1927).
15 S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, THE MENTALLY DisABLm Am m LAW 4 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as S. BRAKEL & R. RocK].
10 F. LnDmAN & D. McINTRE, supra note 13, at 10.
17 See Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603).
18 A. DEUTSCH, TnE MENTALLY ILL rN A-mucA 42 (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter
cited as A. D.urscn].19 S. BnAXEL & R. RocK, supra note 15, at 4.
1974]
KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL[o
their own mentally ill. 20 The first mental hospital in this country
was not constructed until 1773,21 and the second one, built in Lexing-
ton, Kentucky, was not completed until 1824.22 The burden of caring
for the mentally ill shifted from private to public in 1845 vhen the
Massachusetts Supreme Court incorporated the ancient common law
doctrine of parens patriae into its law on commitment.23 Under this
doctrine which views the state as the parent or guardian of the
mentally incompetent person,24 the Massachusetts Court justified the
total deprivation of one such individual's liberty in Matter of Josiah
Oakes. Therein the Court demonstrated the almost limitless extent
of the parens patriae doctrine when it declared:
The right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in
that great law of humanity, which makes it necessary to confine
those whose going at large would be dangerous to themselves or
others.... And that necessity which creates the law, creates the
limitations of the law. The question must then arise in each
particular case, whether a person's own safety or that of others
requires that he should be restrained for a certain time, and
whether restraint is necessary for his restoration or will be con-
ducive thereto. The restraint can continue as long as the necessity
continues. This is the limitation and the proper limitation.25
The Court also concluded that no procedural due process need be
afforded because the state is acting for the individual's good and
therefore is not an adversary.26
It did not take long for reformers to attack the parens patriae
doctrine. In 1860 a Mrs. Packard was committed under an Illinois
statute which allowed married women and infants to be committed
on the request of a husband or guardian.27 After her release, she and
others were instrumental in establishing commitment safeguards and
in improving hospital conditions.28 However, as late as 1962 the
20 Id.
21 Id. at 5. This hospital was constructed in Williamsburg, Virginia. As early
as 1751, Pennsylvania had established a general hospital which would treat the
mentally ill as well as other patients. Id.
22 Id. This hospital, established as Eastern Lunatic Asylum, later became East-
ern State Hospital.
23 Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
24 See BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONAY 1269 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
25 8 Law Rep. 123, 125 (Mass. 1845) (emphasis added).
26 The parens patriae doctrine has also been largely responsible for denial of
due process in juvenile cases. See In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also
Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding,
Its Role in the Administration of Justice, and a Proposal for the Reform of Kentucky
Law, 62 Ky. L.J. 122, 132-64 (1974) for a discussion of parens patriae in juvenile
cases in Kentucky.
27 The Kentucky statute seems to allow this procedure for minors. Commit-
ment is regarded as voluntary, and none of the safeguards of involuntary commit-
ment apply. See KRS § 202.015(1).
28 S. BRAE E. & B. Roci, supra note 15, at 8.
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Supreme Court of the United States still seemed to support this
doctrine, at least in dicta.29 Parens patriae has found limited support
in Kentucky where the Court of Appeals has stated that the inquest
for commitment is for the good of the person whose mental state is
in question 30 and that commitment statutes are generally thought of
as having a benevolent purpose.31 As will be discussed below, how-
ever, procedural safeguards are available to guarantee that a de-
fendant in a commitment proceeding will receive his constitutional
rights.
As for the history of statutory law, it is impossible to generalize
among the states, for the statutes are as varied as the legislatures that
promulgated them. In Kentucky, the first statute concerning the
mentally ill was passed in 189332 and was superceded by a more
comprehensive law in 1918 which provided for the commitment,
care and treatment of epileptic, feeble minded, and insane persons.33
In 1928 the General Assembly again revised the law;34 subsequent
revisions have been enacted, the most recent being in 1968.3r Through
this process of statutory evaluation, the Kentucky commitment statute
has consistently been improved and presently ranks as one of the best
in the United States.
II. CASE LAw OF CIVIL COrfMrMENr
An analysis of the applicable case law is necessary before a full
and critical understanding of the Kentucky commitment statute can
be achieved.3 6 As in criminal law, many constitutional protections
29 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). But see Specht v. Pat-
terson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).30 Cadden v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1951).
31 Sabin v. Commonwealth, 26 S.W.2d 506, 509 Ky. 1930).3 2Ky. AcTs ch. 147 (1893).33Ky. Acts ch. 54 (1918).
34 Ky. AcTs ch. 16 (1928).
35 Ky. AcTs ch. 90 (1968).
36 It should be noted here that the case and statutory law applies outside the
area of involuntary civil commitment. The same safeguards which apply to com-
mitment proceedings also are applicable to incompetency hearings. Incompetency,
other than that due to a bodily infirmity, is classified by the Kentucky Court as a
"species of insanity, for it is a weakness of mind or mental abnormality." Sabin v.
Commovealth, 26 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Ky. 1930). Further, the safeguards given
to people being committed civilly must be given to convicted criminals who, judged
to be insane, are committed after their jail sentence has been completed.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), is a case in which an ex-felon was
given no right to jury trial though the right was granted to normal civil commit-
ment defendants. The case held that once the state made this right available for
some mental patients it could not, consistent with the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, arbitrarily deny it to others, i.e. all mental patients
must be treated alike. The state cannot withhold from a few the procedural
protections or the substantive requirements for commitment that are available to
all others. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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are involved, and the state and federal constitutions as interpreted
through case law can limit a statute or even negate it. Furthermore,
an attorney may wish to attack a statute on constitutional grounds
and, under Kentucky case law, such an attempt may meet with suc-
cess.
The most important case in the field of commitment for mental
illness in Kentucky, and one of the most important nationally, is
Denton v. Commonwealth.37 In 1964 Denton became a landmark in
the United States by greatly expanding the rights of prospective
mental patients and has perhaps gone as far in that direction as any
other case to date. The case involved an appeal from a judgment in
which Mrs. Denton was found to be "mentally ill, dangerous, uncon-
trollable and incompetent to manage her own affairs."38 She had
completed a temporary thirty-five day hospitalization for observation,
when two staff physicians of Kentucky State Hospital, seeking an
order for her continued confinement, filed a certificate stating that
she was mentally ill.39 At the ensuing inquest the only evidence
introduced concerning her mental state was the affidavits of the two
physicians. Mrs. Denton's court-appointed counsel objected to the
reading of the affidavits on the ground that it violated the right to
confrontation guaranteed in the United States40 and Kentucky4' con-
stitutions, but his objection was overruled by the Boyle Circuit Court.
The Court of Appeals reversed.
The Court of Appeals, basing its holding on the equal protection
doctrine, recognized the basic injustice of depriving an individual of
his constitutional guarantees in a commitment hearing.42 The opinion
by Justice Moremen noted the similarity of the commitment proceed-
ing to the criminal proceeding in that, although specific elements such
as criminal intent need not be proved, the potential result of the com-
mitment proceeding is the same as that of a criminal trial-the
deprivation of liberty.43 Justice Moremen then emphasized the guar-
antees available to a defendant in a commitment proceeding:
We recognize that the constitutional command to guarantee "equal
protection of the laws" means equal rights for all those similarly
situated and that some classification is permitted. But we cannot
assume that the bare accusation of insanity acts as a proper classi-
37383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
381d. at 682.
39 [1928] Ky. AcTs: ch. 16 (repealed 1968). The closest edsting provision
is KRS § 202.100 which provides for a sixty-day observation period.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41 KY. CONST. § 11.
42 Denton v. Commonwealth, 883 S'.W d 681 682 (Ky. 1964).
43The Kentucky Court of Appeals has classiied the commitment proceeding
as quasi-criminal. Cadden v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1951).
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fication so that a person so accused may be deprived of his liberty
... without granting to him his full constitutional guarantees. 44
To ensure these guarantees "the defendant should be afforded the
same constitutional protection as is given to the accused in a criminal
prosecution."45 To delineate the rights of the accused the Court quoted
§ 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, which sets a high standard:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard
by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.46
The implications of Denton are far reaching. No other court has so
explicitly stated that defendants in a commitment proceeding are
entitled to their full constitutional guarantees, and a cursory look at the
Kentucky statutory provisions will indicate that even they do not
fully comply with this mandate.
When an individual has been adjudged mentally ill and is receiving
treatment, many of his constitutional rights must be denied,47 but
merely being accused of being a danger to one's self or to others48
does not mean that a defendant is such a danger. A man does not
become guilty by mere accusation; he is entitled to a fair and impartial
hearing. In short, a person should not be deprived of an adequate
opportunity to defend himself merely because someone has accused
him of being insane instead of being criminal.
Denton did not specifically involve all constitutional protections,
so the strict jurist can argue that only so much of the language as is
absolutely necessary to support the specific holding is law. As
previously stated, the objection of counsel in this case was based on
the fact that affidavits of doctors were admitted into evidence with-
out the doctors being present. The Court noted that it had always
been "assumed"49 that it was not necessary for the examining physicians
to appear in court to testify but held the admission of the evidence by
certificate or affidavit to be error, because the right to confrontation
was denied.50
44 Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ky. 1964) (emphasis
46 Ky. CoNsT. § 11.
47 There is no greater invasion of personality than involuntary treatment of
mental illness. The widespread use of drugs makes possible a complete rearrange-
ment of personality and physical functions.
48 KRS § 202.135(6)(b).4 0 Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ky. 1964).
50 Id. at 683. The Court also considered the burden of proof in the proceeding.
This part of the opinion discussed in some detail the statutory provision on burden
of proof which was KRS § 204.140, repealed Ky. Acrs ch. 90 (1968). The present
provision is KRS § 202.135(5).
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Denton is a logical extension of Kentucky law and is supported
by an examination of prior Kentucky case law as well as cases from
other jurisdictions. As early as 1930 the Kentucky Court commented
on the commitment proceeding, expressly noting its grave conse-
quences.51 A subsequent opinion noted that "[t]he most sacred rights
of the individual are involved ....,52 To protect individual rights,
the Kentucky Court has held that unless statutory requirements for
commitment are strictly complied with,53 the judgment is void.5 4
Foreign courts have not read Denton narrowly. The Ohio Supreme
Court, for example, has read Denton as guaranteeing a defendant the
right to counsel.55 Although the right to counsel is guaranteed by
statute in Kentucky,56 this interpretation of the case is consonant
with reading it as guaranteeing all constitutional rights to a defendant.
The Oregon Supreme Court also has cited Denton as guaranteeing
right to counsel.57 One federal district court read Denton as requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt on questions relating to civil com-
mitment,6 8 while another cited it as holding that the commitment
procedure and safeguards should be the same as those in criminal
proceedings. 59 This last and most liberal view, strict construction of
the case notwithstanding, is completely justified by the language of
the Denton opinion. Why would the Court cite Kentucky Constitution
§ 11 in full if it was not to be followed? In applying Denton to
statutory law, this note will proceed on the assumption that the last
reading, which guarantees full constitutional rights in commitment
proceedings, is correct.
Denton has been subsequently discussed by the Court of Appeals
only in Settle v. Triplett,60 which involved not a commitment proceed-
ing, but rather a circuit court appointment of a guardian for an
allegedly incompetent person. In Settle, proper notice was not sent
to the parties as required by statute, but at a later hearing on a
motion to vacate the original order all interested parties were before
the Court and were given opportunity to present their objections.61
Denton was interpreted as holding it to be reversible error to admit
51 Sabin v. Commonwealth, 26 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1930).
52 McFarland v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Ky. 1933).
53 Taylor v. Moore, 65 S.W. 612 (Ky. 1901); Stewart v. Taylor, 63 S.W. 783
Ky. 1901); Menifee v. Eads, 30 S.W. 881 (Ky. 1895).
1 4 Turpins Adm'r v. Stringer, 14 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1929).
55 In re Popps, 292 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio. 1972).
56 KES § 202.135.
57 State v. Collnan, 497 P.2d 1233 (Ore. 1972).5 8 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
59 Dixon v. Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).60426 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1968).
61 Id.
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evidence of doctors by certificate or affidavit in an inquest over the
objection of counsel. The Court distinguished Denton on two grounds:
first, that in Denton there was a direct appeal; and second, that in
Denton, the objection was made by counsel whereas in Settle, the
counsel did not make, and therefore waived, the objection. As an
alternate ground, the Court held that the subsequent hearing pro-
vided an opportunity for all parties to make objections and that since
this cured the defect, no further hearing was necessary.62 The fact
that all parties did eventually appear and that a further hearing
would have been repetitious clearly influenced the Court. Settle is
wholly consistent with the view that construes Denton as requiring
the constitutional protections in commitment proceedings to be the
same as those in criminal proceedings. The objection in Settle was
waived by counsel; and neither the facts nor the language of Settle
otherwise affect Denton in any substantial degree. 63
Denton is not only supportable as a logical extension of Kentucky
case law, but also conforms with the trend of decisions of other
jurisdictions. If chronological sequence is ignored, most of these
foreign cases, although decided after Denton, are logical steps by
other courts toward the Denton guarantee of full constitutional rights.
A key case in this development is Heryford v. Parker,6" which
establishes a definite link between mental incompetency hearings
and juvenile hearings. Although at first blush these two proceedings
appear unrelated, a comparison of the statutes concerning juvenile
proceedings and involuntary hospitalization reveals important simi-
larities. Both hearings have traditionally been regarded as civil, and
in both the application of the parens patriae doctrine is paramount.
Neither has been regarded as punitive, for cure and guidance are
provided to the defendant by the benevolent state. In a juvenile
proceeding, furthermore, the hearing is to be informal, and the presence
of the child may be waived.65 Likewise, in the commitment proceed-
ing the hearing may be informal, and the presence of the defendant
may be waived. 66
The United States Supreme Court held in In re Gault67 that
juveniles must be afforded due process of law, quickly dispensing
with the argument that the proceeding was non-criminal in nature.
The Court said, just as did the Kentucky Court in Denton, that the
62 Id.
63 Id.
64396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
05 KRS 208.060.
66 KRS 202.135.
67 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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central consideration is that the proceeding results in deprivation of
liberty. This doctrine has been expanded in subsequent cases such
as In re Winship,68 which held that proof beyond reasonable doubt
is required in juvenile proceedings. The Court also dismissed the
parens patriae argument saying: ".... the admonition to function in a
parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."6 9
The similarities between these two areas of the law are obvious,
since the same reasoning leads to similar conclusions in both types of
cases. Several courts, noting the similarity, have cited juvenile cases
as authority in commitment cases.70
The Supreme Court has never decided the specific issue of whether
defendants in civil commitment proceedings must be afforded full
constitutional rights. The Court's consideration of this issue heretofore
has been confined to the situation where doctors or prison officials
have attempted to confine a prisoner, who they believed insane, beyond
the period of his original sentence. Often this confinement was the
result of an administrative decision which afforded the prisoner no
right to a hearing.71 This practice was held unconstitutional in
Baxstrom v. Herold,72 which requires that all commitment patients
be treated similarly. The state cannot withhold from a few the pro-
cedural protection or the substantive requirements for commitment
that are available to others.73
Even though the Supreme Court has never directly decided the
issue of full constitutional rights in a commitment proceeding, some
of its dicta is very illuminating. In 1940 Chief Justice Hughes stated:
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process
in proceedings dealing with persons charged with insanity ...
and the special importance of maintaining the basic interests of
liberty in a class of cases where the law though "fair on its face
and impartial in appearance' may be open to serious abuses in
administration and courts may be imposed upon if the substantial
rights of the person charged are not adequately safeguarded at
every stage of the proceeding. But we have no occasion to con-
sider such abuses here. .. .74
68 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
69 Kent v. United States, 883 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
70Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Penn-
sylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
71 See generally L. Lucy & L. HOFFMAN, Tin TRAcc ODEALr OF STEPHEN
DENmcsoN (1970), for the tragic story of a man who spent fifty-eight years of his
life in a mental institution for the original crime of stealing candy and fruit at age
seventeen.
72 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
73 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).74 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1940).
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The spirit of this statement is clearly present in Denton and cases like
it. More recently, in a case involving compulsory treatment for drug
addiction, the Supreme Court noted that a state has the right to
determine that the general health and welfare could require com-
pulsory treatment,75 including involuntary hospitalization. The full
nature and scope of the rights the defendant has in his defense to the
proceeding however remains unanswered.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to a holding on the
specific issue of civil commitment procedure was in Specht v. Patter-
son,76 a criminal case dealing with the Colorado Sex Offenders Act.77
The statute provided that a person convicted of a criminal sexual act
may be punished by imprisonment of one day to life if, in the opinion
of the court, the accused constitutes a threat to the public or is
mentally ill. The statute provided only a rudimentary hearing to
determine if a person did indeed constitute such a threat or is mentally
ill. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, painted with
a broad brush: "These commitment proceedings, whether denominated
civil or criminal are subject.., to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment... * 7" However, the decision is of limited
impact, since it relies upon Baxstrom, which as discussed above held
only that a criminal whose confinement for mental health reasons
was to extend beyond the expiration of his criminal sentence must be
afforded the same rights as a defendant in a civil commitment case.
The case did not consider the constitutional guarantees applicable to
civil commitment,79 and parts of the opinion indicate that the Court
did not intend to direct its decision to that question. Justice Douglas
compared the Colorado statute with recidivist statutes and specifically
noted that the purpose of the statute is not to treat but to punish.80
Justice Harlan, concurring, cited as controlling authority Pointer v.
Texas,81 a case dealing with an accused's rights in a robbery case.
Even though Justice Douglas' dicta is perhaps not authoritative, it is
fully supportive of Denton:
Due process in other words requires that [the defendant] be
present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be con-
fronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-
75 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
7 386 U.S. 605 (1967).7 7COLO. REV. STAT. AN. § 40-2-32 (1963).
78 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
79383 U.S. 107 (1966).
80Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
81380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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examine, and to offer evidence of his own and there must be
findings adequate to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed.8 2
In short, the defendant should be given his full constitutional rights.
II. STATUrORY LAW iN KENTUCKY
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of their's or to impede their efforts to obtain it.
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or
mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering
each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling
each to live as seems good to the rest.8 3
The preceding analysis of case law is primarily introductory, since
in all states today statutes, rather than the common law, regulate
the mechanics of commitment. Consequently, in most situations the
practicing attorney will look to statutes rather than to case law for
the procedures and the substantive law involved. The purpose of this
section is to simplify the Kentucky statutes and provide a practical
guide to commitment proceedings, by analyzing in detail the statutory
provisions and relevant case law.
A. Voluntary Commitment
Although the primary subject of this note is involuntary commit-
ment, the law of voluntary commitment must also be considered, for
if it is not complied with, a voluntary commitment can become in-
voluntary. Any person over the age of eighteen may commit himself
in Kentucky, 4 but a parent or guardian must apply for commitment
of anyone under eighteen.85 A minor cannot validly sign his own
admission papers unless there is a medical emergency, and the parent
or guardian is unavailable.86 The application by a parent or guardian
must be signed in the presence of two witnesses87 which helps to
ensure that no child is committed simply because he is a behavior
problem or does not get along well with the parent.
If a voluntarily committed patient requests release it must be
granted immediately, 8 but he cannot be released on anyone's consent
but his own.89 A minor may be released upon the consent of a parent
or guardian, but after age eighteen the patient must be released at
82383 U.S. 107 (1966).
88 J. MILL, ON LiBEnTY 18 (Gateway ed. 1962).
84 KRS § 202.015(1).
85 Id.
86 68 Op. Ky. Ar. GEN. 486.
87 KRS § 202.015(1).
88 KRS § 202.015(3).
89 Id.
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his request.90 A staff physician also may discharge any voluntary
patient who he deems to have recovered or who no longer needs
hospitalization. In addition, this doctor has power to discharge a
patient to make more effective use of the hospital, i.e., to make room
for someone more in need of treatment.91
A voluntary commitment may become involuntary if a voluntary
patient is denied his request for release. If two staff physicians (who
are not required to have training in psychiatry)9 2 believe that the
patient will "cause injury to himself or others" and that the individual
lacks capacity to make his own decisions, they may have him held for
forty-eight hours after receipt of his request for release.93 After forty-
eight hours the patient must be released unless involuntary commit-
ment proceedings have been instituted; however, the patient may be
held until the proceeding has been terminated by an order of court.94
B. Involuntary Commitment
The Kentucky Revised Statutes provide for three periods of
temporary involuntary commitment ranging from forty-eight hours to
sixty days and for indeterminate involuntary commitment. Since the
procedures differ according to the type of commitment, each must be
discussed separately.
1. Forty-Eight Hour Admission
The forty-eight hour temporary admission95 can be ordered in
three situations. The first occurs as noted above when a voluntary
patient who is still sick applies for release. The second situation arises
when a person in need of immediate treatment and care because of
mental illness or retardation is brought to the mental hospital without
the proper papers required for compulsory hospitalization. Two staff
physicians at the hospital may authorize the person's admittance if they
certify that in their opinions he will probably cause injury to himself
or others if not restrained and that he does not have the capacity to
realize his need for hospitalization. 0
The third use of the forty-eight hour confinement occurs when a
person's "relative, spouse, friend, guardian" or doctor in a hospital
where the person is a patient applies for an involuntary commitment.9 7
90 Id.
91KRS § 202.015(2).92KRS 1 202.010(5).
93KRS § 202.015(4). The forty-eight hour period excludes weekends and
holidays. KRS § 202.117(2).
94 KS § 202.117(2).
J)'KRS 202.117.
1)KRS § 202.117( 1)-(3).
17 KRS § 202.117(4).
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If one of these people can obtain the certification of two physicians
that they have examined the person and have found him to be "in
need of care and treatment in a mental hospital" and without the
capacity to realize his need for hospitalization, the person may be
confined for forty-eight hours.98 The doctor's examination must have
occurred within three days of initial confinement, and an involuntary
hospitalization proceeding must be instituted "without delay."99 The
forty-eight hour commitment is a temporary measure designed to
allow a very short confinement of a sick person until a judicial
proceeding can be commenced. Although this and the foregoing
types of forty-eight hour commitment may not be valid under the
Denton requirements, the period of confinement is short and the re-
quirement to immediately initiate a court proceeding provides some
protection for the confinee. In commitment proceedings there must
be some balancing of freedom and need, and when, as here, the need
is great and the restraint on freedom minimal, the former probably
outweighs the latter. The important safeguard is that judicial hearings
must be instituted without delay.
2. Seven Day Detention
The next-longest period of temporary confinement in Kentucky
is the seven-day detention. Three classes of persons may institute this
proceeding: peace officers; 100 any person filing a complaint in a
circuit, county, or police court;101 and health officers' 02--defined as
any person "charged with enforcing the health law of the state....-x03
When the proceeding is initiated by a police officer or any person
filing a complaint, a hearing is required prior to commitment. A peace
officer may restrain any person, with or without a warrant if he has
"reasonable grounds to believe" that the person is mentally ill and
likely to cause injury to himself or others if not immediately taken
into custody.10 4 Prior to the hearing the police officer is required to
take the person to a doctor for an examination as soon as practical'105
A seven-day commitment order may also be obtained by any
citizen who files a complaint which states under oath that he be-
lieves the accused is mentally ill and will probably cause injury to
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 KRS § 202.027(1).
101 KRS § 202.027(2).
102 KRS 202.245.
103 KRS 202.010(11).
104 KRS § 202.027(1).
105 Id.
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himself or others if not immediately restrained. In addition the com-
plaining party must furnish to the judge the facts on which he bases
his opinion, in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 10 6 If
probable cause is shown the judge is required to issue an arrest war-
rant,'07 and upon arrest the person must be taken to a doctor for
examination. 08 If the physician certifies in writing that the indi-
vidual probably will cause injury to himself or others if not restrained
and that he lacks the insight or capacity to realize his need for
hospitalization, the person may be lodged in a hospital rather than a
jail pending a hearing'09 before a circuit judge, county judge or police
court judge.110 In such situations, Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.02 applies, and the hearing must be held without unnecessary delay.
The defendant's presence may be waived if the court believes that it
will be harmful to him."' If the court finds that the defendant should
be observed and treated, it may order him hospitalized for seven days
with release only by writ of habeas corpus.112 This statute is well
drafted and, except for waiving the presence of the defendant at the
hearing, is within the Denton rule of constitutionality. Although the
waiver of appearance rule will be discussed in detail below, it is not
premature to note that it denies a defendant the right "to meet all
witnesses face to face" as required by the Kentucky Constitution and
Denton." 3
Health officers compose the third class of persons who may pro-
cure a seven-day commitment order for an alleged mentally ill per-
son."'4 If the health officer's request which must be based upon a
personal examination made within the preceding three days"25 alleges
that the person probably will injure himself or others if not im-
mediately restrained, a warrant may be issued. If, in the county
where the person is arrested, hospital facilities are available," 6 the
person must be taken there; otherwise he may be confined in the
county jail." 7 The staff of the hospital where the individual is taken
must decide within seven days if the patient requires further treat-
106 K.RS § 202.027(2).
107 Id.
108 KRS § 202.027(1).
109 Id.
110 KRS § 202.027(3).
"'l Id.
112 KRS § 202.027(5).
113 KY. CONST. § 11.
114 KRS § 202.245.
115 KRS § 202.245(1).
-16 The staff of a state mental hospital is required to receive and treat any




ment; if so, the regular involuntary hospitalization procedure must be
followed.118
The seven-day detention at the request of a health officer is invalid
under Denton as a violation of due process. Although the object of
of this seven-day detention is identical to that of the commitment
hearing-to get a dangerously sick person off the street-it makes no
provision for a court hearing or probable cause requirements which
are necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. In fact,
no hearing of any kind is held within the seven days and the confinee's
only appeal is to the hospital staff." 9 Moreover, the statute defines a
health officer as anyone working for the state health department
charged with enforcing the health laws of the state120 and requires no
specialized training in psychiatry; in reality, he may be no more
qualified to diagnose mental illness than an ordinary citizen. A health
officer can easily get a warrant based on probable cause as a private
citizen if he has grounds on which to base his belief. In light of the
foregoing considerations, it appears that the special proceeding for
a complaining health official is not only unconstitutional but also
unnecessary.
The only other instance under the commitment laws when a
health official has special functions occurs when a resident has been
returned to Kentucky after being adjudged mentally ill or incom-
petent in another state. In this situation the person may be admitted
into a Kentucky state mental hospital at the request of any health
officer,121 or the staff at the hospital may receive the patient directly
if a health officer is unavailable. 2 2 After the seven-day period, the
staff must institute involuntary hospitalization procedures if they be-
lieve the patient requires further treatment. 23  In this situation the
health official is merely a conduit and makes no substantive decision
affecting the rights of the confined person. It may be assumed that
if a state returns a citizen of Kentucky because he has been adjudged
mentally ill, the person had a judicial hearing, but if the hearing has
not been in accordance with Denton and Kentucky law, the judicial
hearing after seven days will cure the defect.
3. Sixty Day Observation Order
The longest period allowed for temporary observation is sixty
118 KRS § 202.245(2).
119 KRS § 202.245(2).
120 KRS § 202.010(11).
121 KRS § 202.252(1).
122 Id.
123 KRS § 202.252(2).
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days.124 Since this is a much longer confinement than is provided by
any of the other temporary observation orders, additional protections
are provided. The procedure is instituted by the filing of a petition
by any resident of the county where the alleged mentally ill person
is living or by a staff physician of a hospital located within the
county. 25 The petition must be filed in the circuit court if it is in
session126 or with the county judge if the circuit court is not in ses-
sion; 27 a proceeding held by the county judge while the circuit
court is in session is void for lack of jurisdiction.128 The petition must
set forth the facts, verified by affidavit, on which the petitioner bases
his belief'2 9 and must contain the name, residence, and location (if
known) of the accused; 30 the name and address of his parents or
guardian,' 3' his spouse, 32 and any near relatives; 133 and, if another
person has custody of the accused, the name and address of that
person.134
Actual notice must be sent to the defendant, to his legal guardian
if he has one, and to his spouse, parent or "nearest other known relative
or friend." 35 Although in Kentucky the right to notice is expressly
provided by statute, it has long been held that basic due process also
requires that fair notice be given in commitment proceedings. 36 The
statute provides several classes of persons to whom notice must be
provided and seeks to ensure that some person having a close relation-
ship with the defendant will have an opportunity to be present at the
hearing and, if necessary, protect the defendant's rights.
The requirement of actual notice can generate problems, as illus-
trated by the facts of Cadden v. Commonwealth.137 The defendant,
Mrs. Cadden, did not receive actual notice because the sheriff, in an
effort to be "more humane," served the summons on the hospital
doctor.38  Whether a defendant should receive actual notice of a
confinement hearing has been a subject of heated debate by phy-
124 KRS § 202.100.
125 KRS § 202.030.
126 KRS § 202.030.
127 KRS § 202.020.
128 Crouch v. Cameron, 414 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1967).
129 KRS § 202.030.
130 KBS § 202.040(2) (a).
131 KRS § 202.040(2) (b).
132 KRS § 202.040(2) (c).
133KRS§ 202.040(2) (d) (2).
134 KRS1 § 202.020(2)(d)(1).
135 KRS § 202.020.
136 Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
'37 242 S.W.2d 409 (1951).
138 Id. at 413.
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sicians.139 Here as in so many other areas concerning mental health,
the disciplines of medicine and law are in conflict. The doctor usually
is willing to forego notice if it will upset the patient, but the lawyer
will insist that no person should be confined after a hearing of which
he had no notice. In Kentucky, the controversy has been resolved in
favor of the legal view, and the requirement of actual notice to the
above enumerated parties must be complied with fully or the pro-
ceeding will be held void. 140
Compulsory confinement of a defendant pending the hearing is
dependant upon the allegations of the petition. After the petition has
been filed, the defendant may be taken to a hospital by a relative or
friend, or he may go voluntarily, but it is not ordinarily required that
he be confined in the hospital pending the hearing. However, if the
petition alleges that the defendant will "probably" cause injury to
himself or others if not restrained and that the defendant does not have
the "capacity or insight" to authorize his own hospitalization, a warrant
may be issued. After arrest the person is to be transported immediately
to a mental hospital where he will be examined by two staff physicians
or psychiatrists who may order the person restrained pending the
hearing.141
The next step in the sixty-day order procedure is the appointment
by the court of two physicians 42 to examine the proposed patient.143
Whenever possible, the physician chosen should have made a special
study of mental diseases; however, specialists in psychiatry are not
required. 144 Certainly, it would be better if the two doctors were
required to be psychiatrists, but most rural counties do not have
such specialists available. To avoid transporting the proposed patient
long distances for an examination, he may be evaluated by a regular
physician.
If the examining physicians state that the defendant appears in
good mental health, the court may terminate the proceedings at that
139 See Weihofer & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAS L.
REv. 307, 340 (1946); Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178, 1194 (1947).
140 Cadden v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1951).
141 KRS § 202.060.
142 These doctors are authorized a fee of ten dollars for each examination,
KRS § 202.139(1). The fee is extremely low but it seems probable that many
doctors will conduct the examination as a public service. The real danger here
lies in the fact that a doctor may examine the patient without doing a thoroughjob. 143 KRS § 202.100. If the person is already hospitalized, the court may waive
this and accept the certification of two staff physicians at the hospital where the
person is a resident. Id.
144 KRS § 202.139(1).
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point.145 On the other hand, if they state that the defendant requires
further observation or treatment, a hearing will be held at which the
defendant must be represented by counsel.146 Note that the statute
requires that the defendant "shall" have appointed counsel.147 This
requirement of counsel, the ramifications of which will be fully ex-
plained below, 1 48 must also be met in an indeterminate hospitalization
hearing.14 In addition, a duty is imposed on the prosecuting attorney
to prevent the involuntary hospitalization of any sane person. 5 °
At the hearing, the defendant or his attorney may summon
witnesses and present evidence as in any other type of case.151
Although a statute allows the certificates of the doctors to be ac-
cepted into evidence under certain circumstances' 52 contrary to the
Denton rule of personal presence, it could easily be held that if the
defendant does not subpoena the doctors as witnesses he has waived
the right of confrontation. The court may, at its discretion on its own
motion, require other evidence in addition to the petition and the
examination of the doctors. 53 Thus it appears that the judge, as well
as the defense attorney and the prosecutor, is expected to guard
against hospitalization of a sane person.
The presence of the defendant at the hearing may be waived if
two regular practicing physicians state that they have examined
the defendant and that they believe his condition would make it
"unsafe or unwise to bring him into court."154 This statute is uncon-
stitutional under the Denton rule of full constitutional rights, which
expressly guarantees the defendant the right to "meet all witnesses
face to face."155 Once again the conflict between medical and legal
values arises. The medical advocates have a strong argument, as one
commentator has noted: "[o]ne of the most objectionable features in
the commitment laws in many states is that concerning the com-
pulsory presence of the prospective patient at the hearing. . . .The
traumatic effect of the hearing on the patient is readily apparent." 56
It cannot be doubted that the impact of hearing a judge, attorneys,
145 KRS § 202.115(2).
146 KRS § 202.136.
147 Id.




152 KRS § 202.138.
153 KRS § 202.115(1).
'4 KRS § 202.130.155 Ky. CONST. § 11. (emphasis added)




doctors, and perhaps witnesses from the community discuss one's
sanity with a view toward involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital would be considerable. However, once a person arrives at the
mental hospital and is told he will not be permitted to leave, will he
not be equally upset? Would it not be more inherently just if the
patient realized that he was in the hospital only after a hearing at
which his defense was presented? Once again the reasoning of
Denton provides the answer. The Denton Court, after expressly dis-
cussing the burden of proof in commitment cases, decided that the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the defendant's insanity. Denying
the defendant the right to be present assumes his insanity and preempts
the very issue that the hearing is supposed to resolve. Unless the state
is entitled to a presumption of insanity, which Denton expressly
denies, the defendant should be afforded his full rights including the
right to confrontation.
4. Indeterminate Involuntary Hospitalization
The proceeding for indeterminate involuntary hospitalization is
basically the same as the proceeding for a sixty-day order although
there are a few significant differences. This proceeding is initiated
by the filing of a petition with the circuit courtST or, if the circuit
court is not in session, with the county court. 58 The same information
must be alleged in the petition,159 and actual notice is required as in a
sixty-day commitment hearing.160 After the petition has been filed,
if two examining physicians state that the patient is not mentally ill,
he may be released without proceeding further; otherwise a hearing
must be held within fifteen days.161
Kentucky's indeterminate commitment law adequately protects the
defendant, but in order to fulfill the spirit of Denton, perhaps more
than bare notice of the hearing should be required. Although not
'57 KRS § 202.135(1).
L58 KRS § 202.135(2). A question has arisen concerning whether allowing
a county judge to hear commitment cases was unconstitutional in Kentucky. The
argument reasoned that allowing a county judge to perform duties normally dele
gated to the circuit judge made the county judge a special circuit judge. This
would be invalid under Kentucky's constitution § 130 which requires all circuitjudges to be attorneys, since only a few county judges are attorneys. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that allowing county judges to hear commitment
cases in the absence of a circuit judge is only the granting of authority to the
county judge and that this authority does not make him a special circuit judge.
Sabin v. Commonwealth, 26 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1930). If the county judge accepts
a petition and holds a hearing while the circuit court is in session, the judgment is
void.
'59 KRS § 202.135(1).
160 KRS § 202.135(2).
161 KRS § 202.135(4).
[Vol 62
CIvm Commnamvm mN KENTucIY
specifically required by Denton, information such as the basis of any
detention, the standard which must be satisfied before the defendant
can be detained, and the names of examining physicians and all per-
sons who will testify against him should be provided. This informa-
tion is essential before counsel can prepare a full defense. 162
The most meritorious provision of the Kentucky statute is the re-
quirement that the defendant shall be represented at the hearing by
counsel in every case. 63 This right is unconditional and may be
neither denied nor waived.164 The patient has also an absolute right
to communicate by sealed mail with his attorney at all times165
which may not be denied under any circumstances. 166 Although no
one can be forced to cooperate with an attorney, the attorney at least
can act as amicus curiae, bringing to the judge's attention any informa-
tion about the alleged incompetent's rights and condition that would
not otherwise be heard.
According to a literal reading of the statute, the defendant has
the right to appear and testify in all cases. 167 However, from a careful
reading it appears that the defendant is in fact, required to be present
unless two physicians state that they believe it would be unsafe or
unwise to bring the defendant into court. 6 8 If this latter interpretation
is correct it represents a distinction from the sixty-day commitment
procedure for which there is no apparent rational explanation.
The proceeding for an indeterminate confinement is the only
commitment proceeding which allows a jury trial,169 and the problem
of whether or not to take advantage of this opportunity is often a
difficult one for counsel. While some commentators have found that
juries are more likely to commit unjustly than are judges sitting
alone,170 others have found that the jury trial operates in favor of the
defendant, often meaning the difference between freedom and com-
mitment.1 71 The only general statement that may be made here is
that the attorney, in making his choice, must take note of all the
16 2 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
163 34 KY. B.J. 136 137 (1970).
164 KRS § 202.135(5).
165 KRS § 202.272(4).
166 KRS § 210.220.
167 KRS § 202.135(5).
168 Id.
169 Id. It can be argued that under the Denton guarantee of full constitutional
rights any confinement requires a jury trial. See text accompanying footnotes 37 to
82 supra.
170 Wiehofen, Improving Legal Procedure for Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill,
31 DicTA 81,85 (1954).
171 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
Il, 44 TExAs L.B Ev. 424, 447 (1966).
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factors involved, including the appearance of his client, the client's
ability to testify in his own behalf, the weight of the medical evidence,
and any facts peculiar to the case at hand.
The hearing is not required to be held in a courtroom and may be
conducted in an informal manner in "a physical setting not likely to
have a harmful effect on the mental health of a patient." 72 There is
no reason why due process of law cannot be afforded the defendant
in a hospital room or in any other location that will make the pro-
ceedings less difficult for the proposed patient. This provision of the
indeterminate hospitalization statute is one of the most humane and
should be incorporated into the short-term commitment proceedings
as well.
In Denton the Court considered at some length the then-existing
Kentucky statute on burden of proof. The statute, since repealed, 173
appeared to place the burden on the defendant to prove his sanity.
The Court, however, noting that the commitment procedure is "quasi-
criminar 174 held that the burden of proof must be borne by the
prosecution. Today, the prosecution must prove that the defendant
"probably wll"'175 cause injury to himself or others if not restrained
and that the defendant lacks the capacity to make responsible decisions
regarding his hospitalization.176 Two of society's interests combine
here: the police power by which society protects itself, and the power
of the state to care for those who cannot care for themselves. 77 Must
the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt? Although
the literal language of Denton seems to require this, it is probably
impossible to prove that the defendant is dangerous "beyond a
reasonable doubt." Perhaps the best standard is "by clear and con-
vincing evidence," which is higher than the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard and more practical than the "beyond a reasonable
doube' standard.178
III. Release
Any discussion of commitment must include the release procedures.
Release is important not only because it terminates confinement but
also because unjustified denial of release, in effect, results in an in-
voluntary commitment. This problem is particularly acute in the
172 KRS § 202.135(5).
173 KRS § 202.140 was repealed by Ky. Acts ch. 90, § 63 in 1968.
174 Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ky. 1964).
'75 KRS § 202.135(6) (b).
176 KRS § 202.135(6) (c).
177 Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79
HAzv. L. REv. 1288, 1293 (1966).
178 Id. at 1291,
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case of a patient who was voluntarily committed. The problems
regarding release of voluntary or involuntary patients arise in two
general situations. First, there is the patient who feels himself sane
and desires release against the wishes of his doctors. Second, there
is the case of the patient who was committed while mentally ill and
is now cured and generally recognized as ready for release.
A. Release Without the Consent of Treating Doctors
The patient who desires release against the wishes of his doctors
has three avenues open to him. First, the patient, his guardian,
spouse, relative, or any "friend of the circuit court" can petition
the circuit court of the county where the patient resides or where
he is hospitalized for a rehearing on the commitment order. On
receipt of this petition the circuit judge or a special commissioner
appointed by him will hold a new involuntary commitment hearing.179
This course of action has the advantages of permitting a new hearing
and possibly having a different judge preside. However, serious time
limitations are imposed: the petition will not be allowed until the
patient has been hospitalized for six months, and, if release is denied,
subsequent petitions may not be made more often than once a year.180
Second, the patient can request the hospital staff to release him.
If they refuse and certify their reasons in writing, the county judge
of the county in which the hospital is located, may, apparently at his
discretion, hold a new hearing at which the hospital staff must be
afforded an opportunity to be heard. If the county judge finds the
person sane, he may order his discharge.18' The reasoning behind
such a statute is unclear. It seems to provide the same type of review
as provided by the circuit judge in the above described procedure but
vith a county judge presiding and without the time limitations.
The county judge may not conduct an original hearing while the
circuit judge is present in the county, 82 but this statute 'allows the
county judge in effect to review the circuit judge's order of commit-
ment.
Finally if the above two procedures fail, any involuntarily hospital-
ized patient may petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The patient or
any "friend" may fie the writ in circuit court in the county where
the patient is held.8 3 It is expected that this procedure will be used
only after other appeals fail to obtain a release.
179 KRS § 202.265(2).
180 Id.
181 KRS §§265.360.




B. Release by the Hospital Staff
The staff of a hospital may, upon a determination that the con-
dition of a patient has improved to the point that his release would
not be injurious to himself or to the public, release the patient without
further proceedings.18 4 The only restriction placed on this right is
that before release the hospital staff is required to determine if the
person is able to financially care for himself. If so, he may be released
immediately; if not, release is conditioned on the hospital staff's
finding friends or relatives of the person who are willing to care for
him.1 85
Release may also be on convalescent status. 86 The basic premise
of such a release is that the person, while not sick enough to be in
the hospital, is still in need of care. If this is the case, the hospital
staff may release him on an outpatient basis, provided that the court
which committed him is notified.18 7 This procedure achieves a num-
ber of goals, the most important of which are that the individual
remains free in society and that the social stigma of being a mental
patient is lessened considerably. The hospital also benefits because
the task of caring for an outpatient is much easier than that of
caring for the person full time, and the state benefits from the
decreased expense. In short, this approach operates to the benefit of
all concerned and should be used whenever possible. Under the
Kentucky statute, the patient on convalescent status must be examined
every six months, 88 and if the doctor finds that the patient is not
responding to this type of care, he may readmit him without judicial
proceedings. 8 9 If he finds the patient no longer in need of care, he
may release him completely.190
Conclusion
The note has attempted to discuss in some detail all facets of
Kentucky's mental commitment procedure required by the statutes
and relevant case law. Kentucky has made a concerted effort through
the General Assembly and the Court of Appeals to adequately com-
promise between the individual's right to freedom and his suspected
need for treatment. Compromises in this area are not easy, and




188 KRS § 202.242(1).
189 KRS § 202.242(2).
190 KBS § 202.242(1).
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problems remain for which a final solution has yet to be found. The
Kentucky statute, read in the light of Denton, does an excellent job
of protecting the rights of the individual. If this law is not enforced,
if it is sidestepped, the people in the mental commitment process, not
the law, are to blame. Suffice it to say that attorneys who know the
law and are willing to force its application can effectively end abuses
in the mental commitment process.
Paul R. Keen
